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L INTRODUCTION 
The problems facing New York City's contracting system have reached a· state of 
crisis, no less real and no less serious than the more conspicuous problems facing the City. A 12 -
month review has convinced this Commission that the City's labyrinthine contracting system wastes 
millions of taxpayer dollars -- dollars which otherwise could be spent fighting crime, drug abuse and 
homelessness. It is mired in red tape, scares away vendors and remains vulnerable to corruption. 
Contracting is the lifeblood of the City's operations. Each year, the City spends more 
than $6.5 billion on contracts for a panoply of supplies, equipment, services and construction. The 
City buys two-way radios, unmarked cars and bulletproof vests for police officers who patrol City 
streets. It buys food to feed homeless families and finds contractors to paint and repair City-run 
homeless shelters. It hires security guards to protect City buildings, contractors to repair City streets, 
and construction firms to renovate City housing. 
To take the measure of the City's giant contracting system, 1 the Commission has 
interviewed more than 60 City employees from 25 agencies responsible for contracting on the City's 
behalf. We have reviewed thousands of pages of contract documents, questioned over 70 vendors, 
consulted contracting experts, studied the work of the State-City Commission on Integrity in 
Government, the Institute for Public Administration and the Mayor's Private Sector Survey, and held 
two days of public hearings.2 
The Commission has found that the City's contracting system is fragmented and 
chaotic. The City's contracting operations are awash in a sea of paper, plagued by inordinate delays, 
and clouded by unclear and inconsistent rules and procedures which slow City business to a crawl 
and discourage vendors from stepping forward to bid. As a result, the City often pays far more than 
it should for goods and services, wasting millions of taxpayer dollars. At the same time, the 
widespread reluctance of vendors to do business with the City offers opportunities for bid-rigging and 
corrupt side-deals. 
Over the past several years, scattered attempts at reform have been made. Often 
working in isolation from one another, well-meaning City workers have tinkered with the system, 
trying here and there to fix the small piece of the contracting maze which falls within their control. 
But New York City's contracting operations are too big and too complex to be reformed piecemeal. 
1 In deference to the work of other groups like the New York State Organized Crime Task Force, a decision was made not 
to include the City's construction operations in the Commission's study. 
2 The transcript of the Commission's hearings on October 24 and 25, 1989 is cited as "Tr.• Exhibits introduced at those 
hearings are referred to as "Commission Exhibit." 
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Meanwhile, the key to real reform of its contracting system has been available to the 
City for many years. Over the course of the past several decades, government contracting has 
emerged in cities and towns across the country as a distinct body of knowledge and expertise. Faced 
with common problems and common concerns, state and local governments around the nation have 
developed common standards and procedures for maximizing competition, negotiating contracts and 
monitoring contractor performance.3 
Unfortunately, advances in the field of government contracting have been ignored by 
many New York City agencies. While other governments have streamlined their contracting 
procedures, simplified their contract documents, developed professional training and certification 
programs for their buyers and devised the kinds of computerized information systems which allow 
them to manage their contracting operations effectively, the City has remained wedded to outmoded 
and inefficient ways of doing business. 
In 1986, the State-City Commission on Integrity in Government ("the Sovern 
Commission") conducted an overview of the City's contracting problems. In a report foreshadowing 
this Commission's work, the Sovern Commission warned that New York's failure to address the 
fragmentation and complexity of its contracting operations was an open invitation to corruption.4 
"Corruption and abuses of trust," the Sovern Commission warned, "shun the bright light of day and 
thrive in the confusion and opacity of procurement laws and practices that lack clarity, consistency 
and uniformity."5 
What the City needs, the Sovern Commission found, is a comprehensive re-
examination and reorganization of the City's far-flung contracting operations. Instead of each City 
agency developing its own contracting policies and its own contracting documents, the Sovern 
Commission urged the creation of one central authority responsible for all aspects of the City's 
contracting policies and procedures, if not for the City's .actual day-to-day purchasing decisions. New 
York City needs someone to orchestrate the entire contracting system, setting procurement policies 
and overseeing their implementation Citywide by individual agencies.6 
Since the Sovern report was issued, a chorus of voices has sounded the same theme. 
The Institute of Public Administration ("the IPA"), commissioned by Mayor Edward I. Koch to 
3 Information on modem government contracting practices is available from organizations like the National Institute of 
Government Purchasing, the National Association of Purchasing Management and the General Services Administration's Training 
Institute. Pertinent details are included in the Appendix. 
4 State-City Commission on Integrity in Government, Report and Recommendations Relating to City Procurement and 
Contracts (November 19, 1986) at 67. This report is cited below as the "Sovern Commission Report." 
5 Sovern Commission Report at 67. 
6 Sovern Commission Report at 70, 92-93. The idea of a central authority responsible for setting procurement policy is 
a long-standing one. As early as 1979, the American Bar Association's Model Procurement Code for State and Local 
Governments included a recommendation for a central procurement policy body. 
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examine New York City's contracting operations, called on the City in November 1987 to establish a 
central procurement panel to assist in developing Citywide procurement guidelines and to propose 
Citywide policies to the Mayor.7 The IPA stressed the City's urgent need to draw on the kind of 
government contracting expertise that is available to other cities and states around the country. 
The IP A also took the Sovern Commission recommendations one step further, 
focusing on how to implement new, uniform procurement policies. The IP A rightly foresaw that the 
development of the new policies would be in vain if the City did not take steps to improve the skills 
of its existing contracting personnel. The City, the IPA warned, suffers from a "serious shortage" of 
staff with experience and expertise in the technical and managerial aspects of contracting.8 The City 
needs to make a sustained effort to recruit and to train contract staff and to improve their contract 
negotiation, contract management and contract monitoring skills.9 
Two years have gone by since the IP A issued its recommendations. Yet, as recently 
as September 1989, the Mayor's Private Sector Survey was dismayed by the lack of clear Citywide 
contracting guidelines and the absence of City-wide training programs. 10 
The City's failure to date to take the steps prescribed by the Sovern Commission and 
the IP A is all the more perplexing given the City's current fiscal bind. The modest investment 
necessary to implement these reforms will result in the saving of tens of millions of dollars each year. 
Dr. Annmarie Walsh, the author of the IPA study, testified that $60 million a year was a "very 
conservative" estimate of what the City could save by remedying the flaws in the City's contracting 
operations. 11 On the capital budget side, the Mayor's Private Sector Survey estimated that the City 
stood to save $3.8 billion over the next 10 years by streamlining the contracting process. 12 Quite 
simply, the City has reached a point where it can no longer afford "business as usual." 
Fortunately, the new Charter adopted by the voters on November 7, 1989 sets the 
City on a new course. A new 5-member Procurement Policy Board, to be appointed by the Mayor 
and the Comptroller, is charged with developing uniform, Citywide rules for soliciting bids, selecting 
vendors and managing contracts. It also has the power to impose deadlines aimed at cutting back on 
7 Institute of Public Administration, Contracting in New York City Government, Final Report and Recommendations 
(November 1987) at 13. This report is cited below as "the IPA Report." · 
8 IPA Report at 5. 
9 IPA Report at 7-9. 
lO The Mayor's Private Sector Survey consists of a group of senior private sector executives loaned by their firms to the 
City to help streamline the management of City operations. Their work is summarized in The New York City Service Crisis: 
A Management Response (September 1989), cited below as "the Private Sector Survey." See .!9,. at 32, 36. 
11 Tr. at 425-26. 
12 Private Sector Survey at 3 7. 
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-the delay which is currently choking the City's contracting system. Simplifying and standardizing the 
contract language which now confuses and discourages potential vendors is also on the Procurement 
Policy Board's agenda. 
Sweeping though the changes called for by the Charter are, they are not self-
executing. Implementing the Charter changes will require the time and careful attention of both the 
new Mayor and the new Comptroller, as well as persistent oversight by the City Council. At the 
same time, the Charter alone cannot restore vitality to the City's contracting operations. Additional 
measures are needed if the promise of reform held out by the Charter is to be realized. 
II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
As more fully discussed below, the Commission urges the City's new leaders to take 
the following steps to bolster the new Charter changes: 
1. The new Mayor and the new Comptroller should undertake a 
nationwide search for the most knowledgeable and experienced 
procurement experts to serve as the five members of the Procurement 
Policy Board. The taxpayers of this City deserve the advice of a top-
flight Board composed only of those with a national reputation in the 
field of procurement. Similar care should be given to the selection of 
the Board's staff. 
2. To oversee the Citywide implementation of the new contracting 
procedures, the City needs a deputy mayor for whom the reform of 
the City's contracting operations would be his or her sole responsibility 
for a transition period of at least two years. He or she must have a 
clear, unambiguous mandate to address contracting problems Citywide. 
3. Each City agency must be required, as the IPA recommended two 
years ago, to appoint at a senior management level a chief contracting 
officer with professional procurement background. The reforms to be 
proposed by the Procurement Policy Board will come to naught if the 
expertise is lacking at the agency level -- where the actual purchases 
are made -- to implement those reforms. 
4. Similarly, the new Mayor must heed the IPA's warning that the 
City suffers from a desperate shortage of experienced contracting staff 
and must take steps to train the hundreds of employees who spend 
billions of taxpayers' dollars on contracts each year. Too much 
money is at stake to entrust this responsibility to purchasing staff who 
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lack the skills and the tools necessary to get the best possible deal for 
the City. 
5. Instead of trying to police each contract before it is awarded, the 
City needs to develop a system for reviewing contract decisions after 
the fact, on a selective post-audit basis, to make sure that contracts 
are awarded in accordance with the City's rules and procedures and 
that the City gets the best value for its dollars. 
The time has come for a comprehensive re-examination and reorganization of New 
York City's entire contracting operations in the light of the government contracting expertise available 
to other cities and states around the country. As witness after witness testified at our Commission's 
hearings in October 1989, the overhaul of the City's contracting system "is not a big deal." 13 All that 
is required is "a captain at the head of the ship" with a vision and the political will to say "this is our 
objective, this is our timetable, let's go to it."14 
ill. THE CITY'S CONTRACTING OPERATIONS ARE A CRAZY QUILT 
OF INCONSISTENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
Contracting is big business in New York City. In fiscal year 1989 alone, the City's 
contracting expenditures accounted for approximately 25 percent of the City's entire budget. Yet, to 
date, no one person has been ultimately responsible for, and thus no one person has been ultimately 
accountable for, the way in which the City spends that money. The Board of Estimate, which has 
historically played a key role in the City contracting process, has contributed to the lack of 
accountability. As Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., chairman of the Charter Revision Commission, 
testified in October: l5 
In tenns of integrity, one of the problems [the Board of 
Estimate] leaves for the City is, if something does go 
wrong, nobody can be held responsible because each [of the 
Board members] can say, "Well, I don't know, we all di.cl 
it," and then they point to each other. Specifically, it lets 
the Mayor off the hook, and I think that is a severe fa ult 
from an integrity point of view . . . . 
13 Tr. at 57. See also Tr. at 107, 241-42. 
14 Tr. at 57. 
15 Tr. at 462-63. 
5 
ResJX>nsibility for the City's purchasing operations varies depending on what is 
purchased, how the contract is awarded, and the dollar amount spent. The lion's share of the City's 
supplies and equipment is purchased centrally by the Department of General Services' Division of 
Municipal Supplies, although small purchases under $5,000 may be made by individual agencies. In 
contrast, the purchase of services (such as security guard services, car services, repair services and the 
like) is decentralized, with each of the City's agencies resJX>nsible for its own purchases, regardless of 
dollar amount. Contracts over $10,000 awarded by methods other than sealed bidding (such as sole 
source contracts and contracts awarded based on requests for proposals16), on the other hand, have 
required the approval of the Board of Estimate before individual City agencies can finalize the award. 
Over the years, the City has developed a crazy quilt of contracting practices and 
procedures which vary from agency to agency or even bureau to bureau, a source of confusion and 
frustration to vendors trying to do business with the City. Because there are few channels for 
contracting personnel in one agency or bureau to communicate with their peers in other agencies and 
other bureaus and to discuss common problems and common solutions, City contracting personnel 
often reinvent the wheel to solve common contracting problems, wasting time and, even worse, 
wasting money. 
In late December 1987, in resJX>nse to the IPA's recommendations, Mayor Koch 
announced the apJX>intment of the first director of the Mayor's Office of Contracts. Many observers 
hoped that that office would serve as the energetic "mastermind" for the City's contracting, carefully 
reviewing and evaluating all aspects of the City's contracting operations with an eye toward 
simplifying and coordinating each of those aspects. In practice, the Office of Contracts has turned 
out to be an "Office of Some Contracts,"17 with a primary focus on the $1.3 billion the City spends 
on sole source and RFP contracts. 18 
From the outset, the Office of Contracts lacked a mandate for a comprehensive 
approach to the City's contracting problems. Executive Order 114, which formally established the 
Mayor's Office of Contracts, was narrower in scope than the IP A re}X)rt which it purJX>rted to 
implement. 19 Missing from the list of the Office of Contracts' resJX>nsibilities is any reference to the 
need to solve what was, to the IPA's mind, perhaps the single greatest obstacle to improved City 
16 In the case of a request for proposals ("RFP"), the selection of a vendor is not based solely on price. Rather, the 
vendor's background, experience and approach to the problem posed in the RFP are also considered. Tr. at 274-76. 
l7 Tr. at 411. 
18 At the Commission's October 1989 hearing, Joel Copperman, Director of the Mayor's Office of Contracts, explained that 
he focused first on RFP contracts because he understood that to be the focus of the IPA repon. Tr. at 318. Accordingly, the 
first - - and, to date, only - - set of uniform contracting guidelines issued by his office deal with procedures for preparing RFPs 
and awarding an RFP contract. See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines For Mayoral Agency Contracting (September 
1989) . 
19 See Executive Order No. 114 (April 13, 1988) . See also Office of the Mayor, Press Release 426-87 (December 8, 1987) 
and Commission Exhibit 18. 
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contracting -- the lack of systematic training programs for City contracting personnel.20 Nor does 
Executive Order 114 mention the need to standardize and simplify City contract language, another 
key IP A recommendation. 
Meanwhile, huge chunks of the City's contracting operations have fallen outside the 
purview of the Office of Contracts. The Department of General Services' Division of Municipal 
Supplies ("OMS"), for instance, enters into approximately $550 million worth of contracts each year 
for equipment and supplies. Although both the State Comptroller and the New York City Auditor 
General have warned that OMS' operations need closer scrutiny,21 OMS' performance has not been 
examined by the Office of Contracts.22 
Similarly, the City spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year on competitively 
bid services -- which run the gamut from car services for children to roof repair services and 
management of City parking garages. Each agency purchases services on its own, subject to its own 
rules and its own procedures. For the most part, these contracting activities have taken place outside 
the purview of the Office of Contracts. The Office of Contracts has yet to complete uniform 
guidelines to govern the award of these contracts and has yet to specify what background and 
experience City buyers of these services must have. 
Even in areas to which the Office of Contracts has turned its attention, it has often 
concentrated on isolated pieces of the problem and has not developed a comprehensive approach. 
For instance, the Office of Contracts has led the Voluntary/City Taskforce on Human Services 
Contracts, aimed at improving the City's contracting relationship with not-for-profit firms providing 
human services to the City.23 But it has not yet dealt in any systematic way with the difficulties 
faced by hundreds of ordinary, commercial businesses struggling to find their way through the 
labyrinth of the City's contract documents and procedures. It has not studied the effect of the City's 
insurance and bid security requirements24 on competition for City business and has not urged the 
20 IP A Repon at 10. 
21 Office of the New York State Comptroller, Office of the State Deputy Comptroller for New York City, New York Cicy 
Depanment of General Services, Division of Municipal Supplies: Procurement Procedures and Practices, Reoon A-24-87 (July 
27, 1988); Auditor General's Reoon to the Mayor on Prompt Payment (October 23, .1987) at 11-12 ("a comprehensive review 
of DOS (DMS') procurement function must be undenaken to investigate some of the troubling contentions made to us by 
numerous agency personnel"). 
22 Tr. at 272. 
23 See Commission Exhibit 31 at 5 and Tr. at 348. 
24 Several wimes.ses at the Commission's October 1989 hearing testified that the City's insurance requirements are excessive 
and out of line with insurance requirements of other jurisdictions. One wimess told of being asked to supply $1 million wonh 
of liability insurance for a three-day training session in contracting procedures. Tr. at 219-20. Another testified that HRA had 
to reject the low bidder on a car service contract because it was unable to meet the agency's $5 million insurance requirement. 
Tr. at 127 -30. Similarly, wimes.ses interviewed by the Commission expressed the view that the City's bid security requirements 
effectively shut many small firms out of the bidding process. 
(continued ... ) 
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-Department of Personnel to design career paths for City contracting staff based on reasonable 
professional training and certification requirements. 
The Office of Contracts has devoted substantial resources to the design and 
development of a computer system -- known as VENDEX25 -- to capture information on the 
background of contractors seeking to do business with the City.26 Little planning seems to have been 
done to answer the question frequently posed by agency contracting personnel: "What will we do with 
this information?" No guidelines have been prepared to govern the agencies' use of this data.27 
In short, the fragmentation to which the City's contracting operations as a whole are 
prone is mirrored in the Office of Contracts. Unless the City's new leaders seize the initiative and 
forcefully insist on a comprehensive approach to contracting reform, their efforts will be frustrated. 
IV. 1HE CITY'S CONTRACTING SYSTEM DETERS COMPETITION 
AND WASTES TAXPAYERS' DOLLARS 
A. The City Has Trouble Attracting A Reasonable Degree Of Competition 
For A Wide Range Of Services 
The problems of the City's contracting system have been compounded by the City's 
reaction to the municipal corruption scandals which began to unfold in late 1985 and early 1986. As 
a result, the contracting process has been saddled with an ever increasing burden of paperwork 
requiring review and approval by many different oversight agencies. 
24 ( ... continued) 
Recognizing that these issues are complex, the Commission does not take a position on them, but urges the City to 
include them in a comprehensive review of the City's contracting process. 
25 VENDEX is designed to insure that the City does not do business with companies who have criminal records, a history 
of poor performance or are in arrears on City taxes. The focus is on excluding "bad" vendors. But an even more pressing 
problem facing the City, as set fonh below, is the need to ~ more vendors. If there were a greater degree of competition 
for City business, the City would be less likely to find itself faced with the Hobson's choice of contracting with a "bad" vendor. 
26 Firms bidding on City contracts over a cenain dollar threshold must fill out a 26-page VENDEX Business Entity 
Questionnaire calling, among other things, for detailed information on who they share office space with, whether anyone in a 
management capacity has ever worked for the City, and what their past contracting history with the City and other government 
entities has been. See Commission Exhibit 12. 
Information from these questionnaires (together with information culled from evaluations of a vendor's performance on 
past City contracts, lists of vendors who have been debarred from City business or against whom other administrative action has 
been taken, and data from contract information systems at DMS and the Mayor's Office of Construction) is scheduled to be 
stored in a computer to which City contracting personnel will have access. Tr. at 285-86. Currently, a printed version of some 
of this information - - known as the VEND EX Caution List - - is periodically circulated to the agencies. 
27 Tr. at 338-39. 
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To he sure, each added layer of oversight originates in a well-intentioned response to 
a particular scandal or crisis. Together, however, they add up to a blueprint for paralysis. Instead of 
a clear vision of what constitutes good contracting practice, the City has pieced together a patchwork 
of checkpoints and barriers. Their cumulative effect is to slow the City's business to a crawl and to 
deter vendors from bidding on City business. 
It is difficult to measure precisely the impact this "nightmare of red tape"28 has on 
competition for City business. Depending on the circumstances, experts consider five bids or three 
bids the bare minimum necessary for adequate competition.29 But the City as a whole keeps no 
records on the extent of competition for City contracts. A brand new computerized contract 
reporting system jointly developed by the City Comptroller and the Mayor's Office of Management 
and Budget is incapable of generating statistical information on the degree of competition for City 
business and could not provide us with information on the number of City contracts awarded on the 
basis of fewer than three bids. 30 
1. Multi-Million Dollar Contracts Go Begging 
For Bidders At HRA 
Because the City lacks uniform rules governing the computerization of each agency's 
contract records, the availability of key contracting information -- and the ability to evaluate an 
agency's contracting performance -- varies from agency to agency. The Commission asked four City 
agencies (Corrections, Transportation, Human Resources Administration and the Department of 
General Services' Division of Municipal Supplies) whether they maintained a computerized database of 
contract information. Only the Human Resources Administration ("HRA") kept the kinds of 
computerized records from which information on the degree of competition for sealed bid contracts 
could he readily extracted. 
28 Tr. at 107. 
29 Tr. at 228. 
JO The Integrated Comprehensive Contract Information System ("ICCIS"), the City's new contract reporting system, is only 
capable of distinguishing between contracts for which a single bid was received and contracts for which more than a single bid 
was received. Because ICCIS cannot differentiate contracts awarded on the basis of two bids from contracts awarded on the 
basis of ten bids, ICCIS cannot provide a breakdown of City contracts based on the number of bids received. 
ICCIS was developed in response to a local law passed by City Council in 1987, which mandated the creation of a 
computerized contract information system for the City. See Local Law 57 (1987); Commission Exhibit 26. Those charged with 
implementing that law candidly acknowledged that they did not attempt co find out what sorts of data other jurisdictions found 
useful to include in their computerized contract tracking systems. Tr. at 358-59. As a result, ICCIS is capable of generating 
less information than New York State's contract ttacking system, which can readily supply statistics on the degree of competition 
for various categories of state business. 
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The Commission examined data on 798 competitively bid service contracts awarded 
by HRA at a cost of $67,804,025 in fiscal year 1989.31 Of these, 389 contracts totalling $51,015,294 
were awarded on the basis of fewer than three bids. In other words, 49 percent of HRA's 
competitively bid service contracts -- accounting for 7 5 percent of $67 million in spending -- were 
awarded with fewer than a bare minimum of three bids. 
HRA was unable to attract more than two bids for a wide range of services. For 
instance, only two vendors stepped forward to bid on a $5.2 million contract to provide cooked meals 
for the homeless in City shelters, although 30 companies had been invited to bid. Only one vendor 
out of 41 was interested in an $850,000 contract to provide frozen meals to homeless shelters.32 
In July 1988, HRA invited 535 car service companies to bid on four contracts to 
drive children in Manhattan, Queens and the Bronx to and from foster homes, hospitals and court 
appointments. HRA received just one bid per contract, each from the same vendor, Big Apple Car 
Services. Its bids ranged from $422,910 on the smallest contract to $3,191,666 on the largest.33 
Altogether, from March 1988 through July 1988, Big Apple Car Services was awarded nearly $9 
million in car service contracts for which it was the sole bidder.34 
The same pattern emerged when HRA sought bidders to install and maintain burglar 
alarms throughout the City. In April 1988, HRA invited 30 vendors to bid on eight separate 
contracts to install and service burglar alarms. Each contract attracted just one bid. All eight 
contracts, totaling over $2.1 million, were awarded to the only firm that bid.35 
2. Other City Agencies Have Experienced Difficulty 
Attracting Vendors 
Other agencies, unlike HRA, could not generate statistics for the Commission on the 
degree of competition for contracts they awarded. The Department of General Services' Division of 
Municipal Supplies, for instance, buys the bulk of the City's equipment and supplies, and awards 
contracts worth over half a billion dollars annually. OMS, however, was unable to produce any 
statistics on the degree of competition for OMS contracts, since its bid tabulation process was not 
31 The Commission was advised that these 798 contracts comprise virtually the entire universe of competitively bid service 
contracts awarded by HRA's Office of Purchasing and Materials Management in FY89. They include, for instance, contracts 
for guard services, exterminating, painting, food services, transponation, asbestos removal, plumbing and roof repair. They do 
not include human services program contracts for day care, foster care and the like. 
32 Human Resources Administration, Temporary ID nos. 9-0010 and 9-0082. 
33 See Commission Exhibit 6, p.2. 
34 !Q. 
35 !Q., p.l. 
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automated until May 1989 and its computer, as of October 1989, had not yet been programmed to 
generate such statistics. 36 
When the Commission asked the Department of Transportation to furnish a list of its 
contracts awarded upon the basis of fewer than three bids, the Commission was told that only one 
bureau -- the Bureau of Highway Operations -- kept the kind of computerized records that could 
generate that information. This lone contract bid data base was created by an employee who brought 
in his own computer from home to get the job done. He had never been asked to set up a similar 
data base for any of DOT's other bureaus or divisions (let alone any other City agency) and, indeed, 
it did not appear that anyone outside his immediate unit was even aware of what he is capable of 
doing, let alone how they could benefit from it. 
Other agencies lacked any effective computerized contract bid data base. The 
Department of Correction, for instance, generated a list of contracts awarded on the basis of fewer 
than three bids but advised the Commission that the information had to be gathered manually, since 
none of the data was available on any computer system. 
Despite a lack of precise computerized data, there is ample evidence that competition 
is scant for millions of dollars worth of City business. As Dr. Annmarie Walsh, the author of the 
IP A study, testified at the Commission's recent contracting hearings, "there is no decent competition 
for a very large part of the City's purchases."37 All too often, the City is faced with a small number 
of "niche" bidders, firms whose expertise lies in threading their way through the City contracting maze 
and who have adapted themselves to its peculiar and confounding logic. 
A few examples illustrate the magnitude of the problem, which is not limited to any 
one agency or any one type of commodity or service: 
• • When the Department of Correction sought to replace 
the repair company responsible for maintaining the 
elevators in City prisons, it split the contract job into 
five separate components and put each one out to bid 
separately. Only one company stepped forward to bid 
-- the very same company the City was seeking to replace.38 
36 DMS did maintain a handwritten log, later computerized, of contract solicitations in response to which a single bid had 
been received, reflecting bids which had been referred to the Comptroller's office for a •second look" before awarding the 
contract. 
37 Tr. at 454-55. 
38 Deparonent of Correction contracts 2CBP88 (8001479), 13CBP88 (8001481), 14CBP88 (8001508), 15CBP88 (8001480) 
and 16CBP88 (8001482) . 
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• 
• • Between October 1987 and June 1988, the 
Departments of Sanitation and Transportation awarded 
five security guard contracts worth $6.8 million to a 
single furn, the only one to have submitted a bid. 39 
• • Fewer than three vendors have bid on the Division of 
Municipal Supplies' contracts for basic food items such 
as macaroni, spaghetti and egg noodles, infant formula, 
frozen pizza and tuna salad.40 
• • In April 1987, the Department of Transportation 
awarded a $980,000 contract to manage a City 
parking facility near City Hall to the only company to 
bid in response to a public advertisement. Over the 
preceding three years, that same firm and its parent 
company were awarded an additional $3.9 million 
worth of contracts to manage City parking facilities. 
In each instance, they were the only one to submit a 
bid.41 
3. Vendors Describe Doing Business With New York City 
As Unusually Time-Consuming, Expensive And Exasperating 
To learn what deters companies from bidding on City business, Commission staff 
interviewed more than 70 vendors, representing companies ranging in size from "mom and pop" 
operations to firms with national reputations and national clienteles, who had recently declined 
invitations to bid on City contracts. Uniform throughout the interviews was the theme that doing 
business with New York City is a time-consuming, expensive and often exasperating experience. 
By far, the top vendor complaint is late payment. Notwithstanding the City's publicly 
announced commitment to prompt payment, the City retains its reputation among the business 
community as a very, very slow payer.42 The problem is of such proportion that many vendors make 
a City agency's payment track record a major consideration in their bidding. If their past experience 
with an agency has been to wait for six months before a check arrives -- or if that is the agency's 
39 Department of Sanitation contracts 08900491, 08900492, 08900592 and Department of Transportation contracts 
08900882, 08900152. 
4-0 Division of Municipal Supplies bid numbers 9800, 11281, 13480, 14154, 14360, and 14891. 
4l Department of Transportation contracts 0890l(i()9, 08900417, 08900192, 08900138, 08901000, G80Ml952. 
42 The director of the Mayor's Office of Contracts testified that he has received "numerous complaints" from vendors who 
have not been paid. Tr. at 350. 
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reputation -- they will not bid. The payment ~ue scares away potential bidders and creates crippling 
cash flow problems. While many larger companies may be able to wait out the delay, smaller 
companies are left struggling to meet a payroll. 
Vendors trying to chase down payments tell of being bounced from division to 
division, dealing with City employee after City employee who cannot find their invoices. One witness 
testified that it took her almost 40 calls to locate the right person to call about a late payment.'13 
Once the vendor's invoice is submitted, then the waiting starts. One painting 
contractor took out a $50,000 loan to meet his payroll until the outstanding City check arrived.44 
Another painting contractor has worked out an arrangement with another company to "buy" his 
finished jobs which the City had not yet paid for. He does the work and then "sells" the contract at 
a discount. That way, the vendor gets paid on the spot and another company collects from the City. 
Without this arrangement, the vendor said that he would have to tum down City work since he does 
not have the cash to bridge the payment gap.45 
The perception that payment will be late in corning is often factored into a vendor's 
bid price. For instance, in June 1988, one vendor agreed to give HRA a four percent discount, in 
exchange for HRA's promise to pay within 30 business days.46 
Vendors also complained about the sheer volume of City paperwork, which adds to 
their overhead and which, for a small company, can be forbidding. One witness described picking up 
an 8" -thick stack of contract documents from the Department of General Services and tying them up 
with a rope to cart them back to his office.47 
Compounding the problem of the volume of the City's paperwork is the lack of 
standardized contract language. Since each City agency writes its own contracts, several different 
agencies trying to purchase an identical service may use several different sets of terms and conditions. 
Vendors complain that this means that there are no clear rules for dealing with the City. As a result, 
they and their lawyers must wade throughout several different sets of fine print to make sure that 
43 Tr. at 84. Her experience at HRA, which was "the worst ordeal [she] went through at any agency," contrasted sharply 
with her experience at the Departtnent of General Services, where "at least you know ·an assigned person in each departtnent 
that's going to be responsible for something. They call you bade and treat you like you're human." Tr. at 86. 
44 Tr. at 125-26. 
45 HRA's Executive Deputy Administrator took issue with vendors' complaints about late payment and testified that "HRA 
now pays 90 percent of all its purchases within 30 days of receiving the invoice." Tr. at 182. At the same time, he 
acknowledged that his agency had done nothing to disseminate that information to potential bidders. !Q. 
46 See Commission Exhibit 14. Similarly, the Mayor's Private Sector Survey found that many construction firms "feel 
constrained to cover their extraordinary risks with often substantial contingency factors." Private Sector Survey at 36. 
47 Tr. at 94-95. 
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there is no hidden term or condition which will come back to haunt them after the contract has been 
signed. As one vendor graphically described the situation:48 
Every agency is different. My biggest problem with the 
City agencies is that every one of them requires a different 
piece of paper. You would think that you were dealing 
with Gimbel's and Macy's and Stems. 
Most City contracts are difficult for vendors to decipher without the help of a lawyer. 
Many small vendors cannot afford to seek legal advice for every contract they are considering bidding 
on. Rather than spend the money it would take to retain a lawyer to review the City's bid 
documents, they simply decide to pass up the opportunity to bid. Vendors who routinely do business 
with other jurisdictions cannot understand why the contracting process is so much more complex and 
cumbersome in the City.49 
B. The Lack of Competition Leaves City Taxpayers Vulnerable 
To Higher Prices 
The shrinking pool of vendors willing to do business with New Yark City is a clear 
warning signal which the City ignores at its peril. The lack of competition leaves the City vulnerable 
to higher prices, wasting tax dollars that could be used to hire more police officers or teachers, repair 
more bridges or house more homeless. 
For instance, before a contract is put out for bid, HRA commonly prepares a rough 
estimate of what the contract should cost. The Commission found that the price of contracts where 
competition was limited to fewer than three bids was more likely to exceed the City's cost estimate 
than contracts where there was a reasonable degree of competition. For example, among the 798 
sealed bid service contracts HRA awarded in fiscal year 1989, the City paid more than its estimated 
contract price 29 percent of the time when HRA received fewer than three bids. In contrast, only 13 
percent of the contracts cost more than the City's estimate when HRA received three or more bids. 
For contracts over $10,000, the cost to the taxpayer of a lack of competition was 
even more striking. HRA paid more than its estimated contract price 46 percent of the time when it 
received fewer than three bids, as opposed to 22 percent of the time when it received three or more 
bids. As a former Deputy Commissioner of the Department of General Services testified, "when you 
have only got one competitor, it's easier to know that competitor's pricing structure. What you'll 
gradually see is a moving up of prices."50 
4S Tr. at 83. 
49 Tr. at 95-96, 107-08, 135, 151 -52, 224. 
50 Tr. at 259. 
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Interviews conducted by Commission staff confirmed this statistical picture. Technical 
staff at HRA estimated that elevator maintenance work costs the City three to four times as much as 
such work costs the private sector. 51 Installers of burglar and fire alarms told Commission staff that 
"City work goes for a premium because of the bureaucracy and red tape. "52 Likewise, a roofing 
contractor acknowledged that his bid prices on City work were inflated by two to ten percent to take 
into account the "aggravation and late payment. "53 
Vendors are often acutely aware of the degree to which they face competition and 
may structure their bids to reflect the presence or absence of competition. Contracting staff at the 
Department of Housing, Preservation and Development told the Commission that the winning bidder 
on a contract to supply handymen to City-owned housing attended a bid opening, bringing with him 
two bid envelopes, one containing a high bid and one containing a low bid. Spotting the 
representative of a major competitor in the bid room, the bidder put in his low bid envelope. When 
the bids were opened, he was dismayed to learn he could have bid the higher amount, since his major 
competitor put in a "no bid. "5" 
A security guard contract awarded by HRA provides a dramatic case study of the 
hidden costs borne by taxpayers when the contract process is poorly managed. In December 1987, 
HRA solicited bids for a two-year contract to provide unarmed security guards to government offices 
throughout the City. Six companies submitted bids. The low bidder was Ogden Allied Services, a 
Fortune 200 company which regularly contracts with the federal government and with states and 
municipalities across the country. Ogden's winning bid of $7.97 per hour per guard came to a total 
bid price of $6.5 million over the life of the contract. 55 
Ogden's experience with this contract was fraught with delay and confusion. Ogden 
had agreed with the City that it would be ready to start work on Monday, January 18, 1988. Ogden 
went out, recruited security guards, and set up training classes for them. Suddenly, late on the 
afternoon of Friday, January 15, 1988 -- just before Ogden was to start work -- Ogden received an 
unexpected phone call from HRA, advising the company that the start date had to be postponed for 
several weeks. The entire class of security guards, whom Ogden had recruited and trained at a cost 
5 l Tr. at 146. Similarly, the Department of Transportation received a single bid on an elevator maintenance contract which 
was three times the agency's cost estimate for the job. OOT's staff decided that the bid price was unacceptably high and put 
the contract out for bid again. Again, there was only one bidder, the same one as before. This time, the bid price exceeded 
the agency's cost estimate by 70 percent. Tr. at 139-40. 
52 Tr. at 135-36. 
53 Tr. at 135. 
54 Tr. at 147-48. 
55 See Commission Exhibit 5. 
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of $50,000, had to be replaced and retrained, since Ogden could not keep its security staff idle for an 
indefinite period without pay.56 
Ogden's contract with the City originally estimated that Ogden would be as.signed 
approximately 280,000 hours of security guard work over the course of the first six months of the 
two-year contract.57 In practice, that figure was slashed in half. When Ogden finally started work on 
February 11, 1988, its guards were as.signed fewer than half the hours anticipated in the contract 
documents on which Ogden had premised its bid.58 As the weeks went by, and Ogden lost more and 
more money, the situation became untenable. In the early spring of 1988, Ogden reached an 
agreement with HRA allowing the company to walk away from the job, 18 months before its two-year 
contract was due to expire.59 
The City's delay in starting the contract and the inability of HRA's staff to predict 
with accuracy the number of hours to be as.signed to the winning bidder cost taxpayers over a million 
dollars. When HRA sought to replace Ogden in May 1988, only two companies submitted bids, 
down from six bidders in December 1987. The low bidder, Professional Security, bid $11.38 an hour 
per guard, $3.39 more per hour than Ogden had bid in December and $2.39 more than Professional 
Security's own prior bid just five months before.60 Overall, from June 1988 through September 1989, 
the City paid $1.2 million more to Professional Security than it would have paid Ogden under the 
terms of Ogden's two-year contract with the City. 
Ogden experienced similar delays on other contracts.61 As a result, this Fortune 200 
firm has withdrawn from competition for New York City business altogether. Ogden's vice-president 
for municipal services testified at the Commission's October hearings that his firm had no plans to bid 
on future New York City contracts,62 although his firm continues to do business with state and 
federal government agencies in the New York City area. 
56 Tr. at 17-19. 
57 See Commmission Exhibit SA and Tr. at 20-21. 
58 Tr. at 21. 
59 Tr. at 23, 26. 
60 See Commission Exhibit S. 
61 Although Ogden was the winning bidder on a contract to install venetian blinds, it took the City ten months to issue 
a stan work order. See Commission Exhibit SB and Tr. at 33. 
62 Tr. at 3S-36. 
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V. TIIE CITY'S CON1RACTING SYSTEM IS CRIPPLED BY DELAY 
The levels of review and approval -- from the Board of Estimate on down -- which 
overlay the City's contracting operations cause normal contracting activities in the City to take far 
longer than would be acceptable anywhere else. The Mayor's Private Sector Survey was dismayed to 
learn that: 
Equipment procurement processes frequently drag on for 
years, often double or triple the time taken by commercial 
organizations. For example, the recent purchase of 12 
personal computers by one department (a $75,000 
expenditure) rook 30 months at a processing cost of 
$65,000 in management and clerical time. 63 
The Private Sector Survey was equally disturbed to find that the purchase of supplies costing between 
$10,000 and $50,000 takes as long as two and a half months; purchases over $50,000 take an 
average of five months, "months longer than in the private sector."64 
An ordinary consultant contract is now subject to ten separate layers of review and 
approval, not counting either the layers of internal review within the agency awarding the contract or 
the Board of Estimate.65 First, the solicitation documents, and/or additional related forms and 
paperwork, are reviewed by the Mayor's Office of Operations, the Mayor's Office of Management and 
Budget, and the Mayor's Office of Contracts before the contract is publicly advertised or disseminated. 
Then, when a vendor has been selected, the contract is reviewed again by the Mayor's Office of 
Operations, the Mayor's Office of Management and Budget, and the Mayor's Office of Contracts. 
In addition, the contract must be approved as to form by the Corporation Counsel. 
For contracts over $50,000, detailed information on the breakdown of the vendor's workforce by sex, 
race and national origin must be submitted to the Bureau of Labor Services for review; and the 
63 Private Sector Survey at 77. See also Commission Exhibit 20 at 77. 
64 !Q. at 99. DMS representatives informed the Commission that as of October 1989, their procurement cycle was, on 
average, 65 days long. However, that figure included purchases under $ 10,000 which are made in accordance with a simplified, 
streamlined procedure involving far fewer levels of review and approval and therefore much Jess time-consuming than the 
procedures for purchases over $10,000. Tr. at 223. 
As of October 1989, OMS was incapable of generating statistics on the length of its procurement cycle for contracts 
between $10,000 and $50,000 and contracts over $50,000, although DMS was hopeful that its computer would be programmed 
to do so in the near future. 
65 See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Appendix C ("Oversight Review and 
Approval Requirements"), section CI and Commission Exhibit 19. 
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-vendor's name, applicable holding companies and principals must be checked by the Department of 
Investigation to determine whether they have been or are about to be investigated by the City.66 
Finally, the contract must be registered by the City Comptroller. There, the Office of 
Contract Administration reviews the final contract documents, as well as a cover sheet needed to 
instruct the City's computer to set aside the funds to pay for the contract. The paperwork is then 
shipped to the Financial Information Services Agency ("FISA") where the actual encumbrance of City 
funds for the contract occurs. Statistics compiled by DMS, the Department of Transportation and 
the Comptroller's Office indicate that the registration process alone may add three to four weeks to 
the contract award process.67 
Throughout the City, contracting personnel interviewed by the Commission voiced 
their frustration at their inability to get their jobs done more expeditiously. They told the 
Commission that, if all goes well, it takes a minimum of four to six months to award a consultant 
contract requiring approval by the Board of Estimate. It takes a minimum of three or four months to 
award an ordinary service contract for work and labor, which does not require Board of Estimate 
approval. 
Many of these contracting employees were at their wits' end. They realize that the 
sluggishness of the City's contracting operations impairs vital City programs. They realize too that 
vendors are overwhelmed by the delay which afflicts every aspect of the contracting process, from 
contract approval to payment. Yet there is little that any one employee, alone and isolated, can do 
about the problem. 
So crippling are the delays inherent in the City's contracting process that the need to 
proceed with dispatch leads the City, on occasion, to take shortcuts. For example, in October 1988, 
the Board of Estimate approved the award of a $6.3 million consultant contract to a naval 
architecture firm, John J. McMullen Associates, Inc., to. oversee the construction of an 800-bed 
floating prison for the City. How McMullen was selected illustrates the dilemma which the City's 
antiquated contracting system routinely poses for City employees: do you break the rules in order to 
get the job done quickly? Or do you follow the rules and risk taking months to implement vital City 
programs? In the case of the jail barge, the City opted for the first alternative. 
According to the findings of the New Yark City Department of Investigation ("DOI"), 
this multi-million contract was never publicly advertised. George G. Sharp, Inc., a naval architecture 
firm with experience in converting ferries into floating prisons for the City, was not even invited to 
bid on the job. Of the three naval architecture firms the City contacted by telephone, only one 
66 Review by Corporation Counsel is required for City contracts over $10,000. Tr. at 268, 273. Submission of the BLS 
forms is required for contracts over $50,000. Tr. at 268-69. The OOI name check is required for consultant contracts over 
$10,000 and for competitive sealed bid contracts over $100,000. Tr. at 269, 334-36. 
67 See Commission Exhibit 16. In April 1990, the City is planning to set up a pilot project at HRA aimed at accelerating 
the registration process. Tr. at 375-76. 
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firm -- McMullen -- was invited to meet privately with City officials to discuss the contract.68 The 
two other naval architecture firms received brief telephone calls, which gave them no inkling of the 
magnitude of the contract. 69 
Once the $6.3 million contract was negotiated with McMullen, City officials cut 
comers and skirted normal contract review and approval channels. Ordinarily, consultant contracts 
of this nature are reviewed by the Mayor's Office of Contracts before submission to the Board of 
Esrimate. Here, the Office of Contracts was simply bypassed. The director of the Office of Contracts 
did not even hear about the contract until it was a fait accompli and had been reported in the 
newspapers. 70 
Finally, as determined by DOI, senior City officials, on three separate occasions, 
provided misleading information to the members of the Board of Estimate who voted to approve the 
contract. In DOI's words, "the process used to select [McMullen] was misrepresented to the Board of 
Esrimate in the resolution submitted in support of the contract; during testimony given before the 
Board on October 20, 1988; and in response to inquiries made by Board of Estimate members 
following the publication of the Daily News article [in December 1988]."71 
In hindsight, City officials explain the comer-cutting which lies at the heart of the 
McMullen contract -- the failure to publicly advertise the contract or even to disseminate information 
about the contract evenhandedly, the failure to dear the contract through the Mayor's Office of 
Contracts -- as necessary to get an important job done as quickly as possible.72 The need for such 
comer-cutting is striking evidence of the ineffectiveness of the City's existing contracting system. 
68 New York City Depamnent of Investigation, Memorandum from Allan Morofsky and Thomas F. Brennan, Award of 
Contract to John J. McMullen Associates, Inc. by the Depamnent of Correction (Case #0117/890), April 12, 1989 ("the 001 
jail Barge Repon") at 12. 
69 !Q. at 12, 14. Only one of these two firms received a shon follow-up letter which also failed to fully describe the 
magnitude of the prospective contract. 
70 Tr. at 342-43. 
7 l 001 Jail Barge Repon at 8-9. See also .!Q,. at 23 ("to the extent the resolution indicates that personal interviews with 
the finalists preceded the selection of [McMullen], the resolution was drafted with a disregard for accuracy"); 24 ("the evidence 
substantiates that the selection process used to select [McMullen] was misrepresented to the Board of Estimate in the language 
of the resolution and in the testimony ... "); 25 ("this investigation has substantiated that the information given to the Board 
with respect to ... two [related] contracts [awarded to McMullen] was inaccurate and misleading"). 
72 001 Jail Barge Repon at 37, Tr. at 344. The Mayor's Office of Contracts has subsequently included in its guidelines 
for RFP contracts a one page set of rules for "Expedited RFPs", designed to ensure a minimum degree of competition even where, 
as in the McMullen case, the RFP process is accelerated. See Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Pan VI, Chapter 
1, p.1. 
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VI. TiiE CITY'S CONTRACTING SYSTEM IS VULNERABLE 
TO CORRUPT INFLUENCE 
The refusal of respected and qualified companies to do business with New York City 
is a warning the City cannot afford to ignore. Prosecutors have long recognized that where municipal 
contracts are let to a narrow group of firms, opportunities for corruption abound. Indeed, a 
questionnaire developed by the U.S. Department of Justice to assist citizens in assessing "whether 
official corruption or an atmosphere that is conducive to official corruption might exist in their state 
or city government" asks as its first two questions:73 
1. Do respected and well-qualified companies refuse to do 
business with the city or state? 
2. Are municipal contracts let to a narrow group of firms? 
Witnesses at the Commission's October 1989 hearings warned that competition is 
essential not only to keep prices down but to "keep the system honest": 74 
[T]he less competition, I think, the more room there is for 
corruption. Where you have a lot of people vying for a 
particular piece of business, they'll pretty much keep each 
other honest. When you have very limited competitors, 
then I think you have more of an opportunity, if you will, 
to decide how to split up that business. 
An absence of competition not only leaves the City vulnerable to bid-rigging and , 
other forms of collusive behavior on the part of vendors, but sets the stage for collusion between City 
contracting personnel and vendors.75 
The difficulty vendors have in finding their way through the bewildering maze of the 
City's contracting procedures is in itself a potential corruption hazard. The Sovern Commission 
cautioned the City three years ago that "corruption and abuses of trust shun the bright light of day 
and thrive in the confusion and opacity of procurement laws and practices that lack clarity, 
consistency and uniformity."76 As the Sovern Commission warned, "when rules are obscure, confused 
or unavailable, they can be manipulated for corrupt ends. Clear and accessible rules not only make it 
13 See U.S. Deparnnent of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Maintaining Municipal Integrity: Trainer's Handbook (April 
1980) at Appendix F, p. 275. Relevant portions of the Justice Deparnnent questionnaire are reprinted in the International City 
Management Association's useful handbook, The Ethics Factor (May 1988) at 20. 
74 Tr. at 227. 
75 Tr. at 259-60. 
76 Sovern Commission Report at 67. 
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easier for decent contractors to do business with the City; they also make it less likely that corruption 
will go undetected. "77 
Ironically, the red tape with which the City has cloaked the entire contracting process 
threatens the very integrity of the system it is designed to protect. As the City's Auditor General 
testified at the Commission's October hearings, unless the City commits the resources necessary to 
clarify and simplify the City's "byzantine" contracting procedures, it is "doomed to [repetitive] cycles of 
corruption, of terrible waste and abuse in government. n7B 
The McMullen jail barge contract illustrates some of the hazards inherent in a 
contracting system overburdened with red tape. DOI, which reviewed in detail the process by which 
McMullen was selected, concluded that the deal itself was not corrupt and that there was no 
evidence that any City officials personally benefited from the award. 19 But the steps taken by senior 
City officials, even though not in fact corrupt, were consistent in outward appearance with a corrupt 
deal. And a deal that looks corrupt can and does undermine the confidence of the public and 
competitors in the integrity of the City's contracting process. 
The award process for the jail barge consultant contract sends an dangerous message 
to the public and to City contracting employees. To the public, and particularly to the business 
community, it sends the message that City business is not open to all comers, that only those with an 
"inside track" can successfully gain access to lucrative City contracts. To City contracting employees, 
it sends the message that comer-cutting is acceptable, that playing fast and loose with the rules and 
the facts is permissible. This may not be a case of "corruption" in the literal sense that no City 
official personally benefited from it. But the message it sends is deeply corrosive of the integrity of 
the contracting process, which depends on the appearance as well as on the reality of fairness and 
evenhandedness among vendors. 
VII. TI-IE NEW CHARTER PAVES TI-IE WAY FOR REFORM 
The new City Charter adopted by the voters on November 7, 1989, requires a radical 
reshaping of the contracting process in New York City. The Board of Estimate, which has had final 
approval over all contracts awarded by other than competitive sealed bids, has been eliminated. 
Procurement is now plainly and unambiguously an executive function, one for which the Mayor is 
now clearly accountable. 
77 Id. at 91. 
1B Tr. at 417, 427. 
79 001 Jail Barge Repon at 37. 
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The Charter creates a new 5-member Procurement Policy Board, similar to the panel 
of experts recommended by both the Sovern Commission and the Institute for Public Administration 
in their earlier studies of weaknesses in New York City's contracting system.80 The Procurement 
Policy Board has Citywide authority over both mayoral and non-mayoral agencies (such as the Board 
of Education and the Health and Hospitals Corporation) and is charged with establishing a Citywide 
set of rules for awarding and administering contracts to which individual agencies must adhere.81 
To address the problems of delay which have plagued the City's contracting system, 
the Procurement Policy Board has been given the power to set deadlines which agencies must meet in 
awarding contracts and to impose deadlines for payment.82 Agencies which fail to meet payment 
deadlines will, like state agencies, have to pay interest to vendors they have kept waiting.83 
Written into the new Charter is an ambitious timetable for drafting and promulgating 
the new contracting rules.84 Members of the Procurement Policy Board are to be appointed by 
January 15, 1990. By June 1, 1990, drafts of the proposed rules must be ready for public comment 
and debate. The goal is for the new rules to take effect September 1, 1990, the date set for the 
demise of the Board of Estimate. 
VIII. 'IHE CITY NEEDS AN ACTION PLAN TO MEET 
'IHE CHALLENGE POSED BY 1HE NEW CHARTER 
Sweeping as the Charter changes are, they amount to only a partial blueprint for 
reform. Much remains for the new Mayor, the new City Comptroller and the City Council to do. 
A. The City Must Undertake A Nationwide Search For Procurement Experts 
To Serve On The Procurement Policy Board 
The broad powers the new Charter gives to the Procurement Policy Board are the key 
to contracting reform in New York City. The taxpayers of this City deserve nothing less than the 
advice of the most knowledgeable and experienced procurement experts available in this country. To 
80 New York City Chaner, § 311 (a). 
81 New York City Chaner, §311 (b). 
82 New York City Chaner, §§311 (b)(6) and 332. 
83 New York City Chaner, §332. 
84 New York City Chaner, §I 152(d). 
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find them, the Mayor and the Comptroller must look conduct a nationwide search for Board members 
and staff with a national reputation in the field of procurement.85 
At the Commission's October 1989 hearings, the author of the IP A study described 
the parochialism of New York City's contracting staff and contracting operations:86 
[F]or an employee organization with over a quaner of a 
million employees, [New York City] is ... incredibly 
insulated. Reinventing the wheel drove us crazy in our 
work . . . They say [they] don't want to recruit somebody 
from the outside because [outsiders] don't know how the 
City works. [But] if the City isn't working in certain 
areas, you have to break that open. 
Because so many of the City's contracting personnel are not familiar with advances in 
the field of government contracting, the City as a whole has lost the benefit of fresh ideas and new 
approaches that have worked well elsewhere.87 At this critical juncture, the City cannot afford to 
continue to tum its back on national developments in public contracting. Each of the five members 
appointed to the Procurement Policy Board, as well as senior staff hired to assist the board members, 
must have a proven track record in the procurement area. 
Adhering to the tight schedule laid out in the Charter for the appointment of the 
Procurement Policy Board and for the promulgation of new contracting regulations is essential. 
Taxpayers are ill-served by the City's present contracting system and are entitled to expect their 
leaders to meet the Charter-imposed deadlines for its replacement. Only by selecting people with 
professional experience in the contracting field can the City hope to do so.88 
B. Procurement Reform Must Be Made A Top Administrative Priority, 
Under the Aegis Of A Deputy Mayor For Procurement 
The new Mayor needs to appoint a Deputy Mayor whose sole responsibility is the 
reform of the City's contracting operations. The City urgently needs one individual who has a bird's-
eye view of the City's entire $6.5 billion contracting system. Currently, responsibility is so diffuse that 
85 The Chaner itself is silent on whether the five members of the Procurement Policy Board are to be full -time salaried 
board members or, like directors of a corporation, are to be pan-time advisors. 
86 Tr. at 441 (emphasis added). 
87 Included in the Appendix is a shon list of organizations which provide resource material and/or training in the field of 
government contracting. 
88 It took the Mayor's Office of Contracts nearly 18 months to issue its contracting guidelines for RFP contracts. Wimesses 
at the Commission's October 1989 hearings testified that contracting guidelines could be rapidly prepared if the task is made 
a high priority and assigned to personnel "with real procurement experience." Tr. at 57-58, 236-37, 241-42. 
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coordinated reform is virtually impossible. As the New York City Auditor General remarked in her 
testimony:89 
[l]t's as though we were building a bridge and instead of 
giving someone responsibility for the entire bridge, it's "you 
put this rivet in," "you go inspect the rivet" and by the time 
all of that is done, the bridge has never gotten built, 
because everybody was so focused on the one rivet. 
New York City urgently needs a comprehensive, top-to-toe re-examination of its 
contracting operations. The City can no longer afford to tinker with pieces of the system, 
implementing changes and im[K>Sing new requirements without carefully analyzing how they effect the 
system as whole. The City needs to · take stock of the personnel -- at every level, from buyers to 
deputy commissioners, in every agency -- presently responsible for the City's contracting operations 
and consider whether they have the background, training and support necessary to get the job done. 
The City needs to examine thoroughly the extent of competition for each segment of 
City business and carefully consider how to attract more bidders and expand the pool of vendors 
willing to do business with the City. The City also needs to re-visit each and every clause in its 
contract documents, standardize and simplify its contract language, review its insurance and bid 
security requirements, accelerate the contract registration process and take a hard look at the various 
computerized contract data bases which are being developed throughout the City, often in isolation 
from one another, to make sure that they are capable of generating the kinds of information 
necessary to manage the contracting process effectively. 
C. Every Agency Must Appoint A Chief Contracting Officer 
The new Mayor must heed the IP A's warning that every agency with contracting 
responsibilities needs a senior level chief contracting officer with professional experience in contract 
design, vendor selection and contract management.90 It is unthinkable that any agency Commissioner 
would wish to confront the thicket of laws governing municipal behavior without the advice of the 
agency's general counsel. It should be equally unthinkable for Commissioners who preside over the 
expenditure of millions of dollars in contracts to do so without the advice of a Chief Contracting 
Officer who knows how to attract better contractors, increase competition, forecast costs, improve 
specifications, negotiate contracts and monitor vendor performance. 
The passage of the new Charter makes the appointment of chief contracting officers 
all the more important. Within the framework of the uniform contract rules to be laid down by the 
Procurement Policy Board, individual agencies will gain increased contracting autonomy. Although 
89 Tr. at 430. 
90 IP A Report at 7-8, 20. 
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the Mayor must certify for each contract awarded by means other than competitive sealed bids that 
all procedural requirements have been met in awarding the contract,91 the Mayor may delegate that 
certification function to the agencies, provided he has adequate assurance that the agency is adhering 
to the Procurement Policy Board's rules.92 
The way to insure that agencies adhere to those rules is not for the Mayor's office to 
police every single contract. The City can no longer afford to diffuse accountability among layers of 
checkpoints and controls. Rather, the Mayor must see to it that every agency has in place staff with 
sufficient knowledge and training to understand and implement the new contracting rules. 
The key to making sure that agency contracting staff have the necessary background 
and training is for each agency to appoint a Chief Contracting Officer, equipped with the specialized 
skills and experience necesary to make sure that the City gets the most for its contract dollars. He or 
she would have primary responsibility for all aspects of the agency's contracting functions and could 
be held accountable if mistakes occur.93 Beside advising the Commissioner on specific contract 
actions and developing internal guidelines and information systems consistent with new Citywide 
regulations, a key responsibility of the Chief Contracting Officer would be the development of training 
programs and career paths for agency contracting personnel. 
Although Mayor Koch publicly endorsed the IP A study and its recommendations at a 
press conference in late 1987, no directive was ever issued requiring each agency Commissioner to 
appoint a single high-level contracting professional to oversee the agency's contracting operations. 
On the contrary, some agency contracting personnel have complained that their requests for funds to 
create and staff an agency-wide chief contracting officer position have been turned down by the 
Mayor's Office of Management and Budget. 
Instead, the contracting function remains, in most agencies, an organizational 
stepchild. Lawyers from an agency's legal staff or personnel from an agency's budget office have been 
called upon to shoulder contract responsibilities. A recent set of guidelines issued by the Mayor's 
Office of Contracts allows agencies to choose to appoint either one chief contracting officer with 
agency-wide responsibility or several chief contracting officers, each responsible for one or more 
divisions or bureaus within the agency.94 While there is certainly a need for experienced contracting 
professionals at the division and bureau levels, they are no substitute for a senior contracting person 
at the highest level in each agency to serve as the Commissioner's right hand on contract matters. 
The present arrangement, by fragmenting responsibility for agency contracting operations, virtually 
91 New York City Chaner §327(a) . 
93 For a detailed description of the role of the Chief Contracting Officer,~ IPA Repon at 7-8, 60. 
94 See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Pan I, Chapter I, p.1. 
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guarantees that contracting problems will not receive the high-level attention and management 
resources they deserve. 
For the City to persist in ignoring the IPA's recommendation is "penny wise and 
pound foolish."95 Dr. Annmarie Walsh, the author of the IPA study, testified at the Commission's 
hearings that the appointment of a Chief Contracting Officer in each agency • · coupled, among other 
things, with upgrading the experience and training of City contracting staff and improving the City's 
data collection · · would save the City a minimum of $60 million dollars in the first year alone.96 
These are savings which the City simply cannot afford to pass up. 
D. The City Must Overcome Its Acute Shortage 
Of Skilled Contracting Personnel 
The City must devote serious attention and resources to training its contracting staff. 
Over and over again, witnesses at our October 1989 hearings testified that there is an urgent need to 
upgrade the skills of City contracting personnel who, compared with their peers in other major cities, 
lack exposure to modem government contracting practices.97 Although professionalism "is the key to 
both improving the quality of [the City's contracting] performance and minimizing opportunities for 
corruption," the IP A found that the City suffers from a "crisis-level shortage of technically skilled 
contracting officers" and that "professionalization in contract management is inadequate at all levels in 
City govemment."98 
Training is especially critical for contracting personnel, scattered throughout the City, 
who purchase hundreds of millions of dollars worth of services. Services are often harder to buy than 
goods99 and the employees who are responsible for buying them are even less likely to have received 
any professional training than the City's employees who buy commodities, equipment and supplies. 
Indeed, the lack of competition for City business can be partly attributed to the 
inexperience of some City contracting staff, who are often ill-equipped to attract new vendors to the 
95 Tr. at 425. 
96 Tr. at 425-27. 
97 Tr. at 50-51, 237-40, 423-24, 441, 446, 454. See also IPA Report at 5 ("many of [the City's contracting] problems stern 
from a serious shortage in City government of staff and managers with broad and deep experience and expertise in the technical 
and managerial aspects of contracting") . 
98 IPA Report at 6, 37, 60 (emphasis added) . 
99 Tr. at 240. 
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City. For instance, to supplement public advertisements in the City Record, 100 agency contracting 
personnel often fall back on the simple expedient of mailing bid invitations to anyone listed in the 
Yellow Pages or other directory under a relevant heading, without regard for their business experience 
or qualifications. Even this limited outreach often amounts to too little too late. 101 The Department 
of Correction, in one instance, began combing contractor directories for elevator repair firms shortly 
before vendors' bids were due, even though the agency had known for over six months that there was 
a need to expand the pool of potential vendors in order to replace a vendor with whose performance 
the agency was dissatisfied. It was hardly surprising that the solicitation effort netted just two bidders 
-- and that the low bidder was the very firm the agency was seeking to replace. 
The City's bid solicitation efforts are often seriously misdirected. In a study of 
responses from 2,031 vendors who declined invitations to bid on 720 sealed bid contracts awarded by 
HRA between September 1987 and June 1989, the Commission found that nearly half of the vendors 
either received the City's bid materials too late to submit a bid or were not even in the business of 
providing the desired service. 102 For instance, bid documents for elevator maintenance contracts were 
mailed to an artesian well company; "Island-Wide Photo" was sent bid documents for a contract to 
repair window sashes; one ironworks company, three asphalt paving companies, one hydrographic 
survey company, one water main and sewer company and six construction companies were invited to 
submit bids on a contract to install canvas awnings. 103 
The problem is not restricted to HRA. When only one vendor responded to DMS' 
invitation to bid on a contract to supply nearly two thousand refrigerators to the City for use in 
renovated apanments, the Comptroller found that many of the vendors invited to bid sold 
"refrigeration systems," a different commodity altogether from the ordinary appliances DMS was 
lOO The City Record is a little known City publication in which, by law, publicly let contracts must be advertised. It is 
so poorly organized that it is often difficult for busin~ to identify contract opportunities in which they might be interested. 
Bid opportunities are not listed in the Q!Y Record alphabetically by type of commodity or service sought • • 
~uctioneering, }?urglar alarm installation, £Onstruction, f!ata processing and so on • • but by the name of the agency advertising 
for bidders. The effect is the same as if "Job Wanted" ads were organized by the name of the employer, instead of by the type 
of situation available: the prospective vendor must comb through the entire publication to find what he or she is interested in. 
To improve the way the City solicits bids, the new Charter, §325(b), gives the Procurement Policy Board the power 
to revise the City Record's current format. 
lOl The Police Department is one of the few agencies which has developed a computerized system that "tickles the file" 
several months before an existing contract is due to expire, so that buyers can get a head start on soliciting bids for the new 
contract. 
!02 See Commission Exhibit 7 and Tr. at 117. To say, as HRA's Executive Deputy Administrator said at the Commission's 
October 1989 hearings, that "you want to give every type of firm an opportunity to bid," Tr. at 174, is no substitute for the sort 
of careful market analysis which is necessary to insure that invitations to bid on City contracts generate a meaningful degree 
of competition for City business. 
103 Tr. at 118-19. 
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looking to buy. 104 As of August 1988, OMS' mailing list for bids for frozen waffles and pizza included 
a vendor who had been debarred the previous year, at the Department of General Services' initiative, 
from doing business with the City for a period of three years. 105 
In large part, the City is out of touch with the entire professional field of government 
procurement, an area of professional competence complete with professional examination and 
certification procedures, a professional oath and a code of professional ethics. At present, there is no 
requirement that the hundreds of employees who spend billions of taxpayers' dollars on services, 
supplies, equipment or construction be professionally certified as proficient in buying skills. 106 
Just as the City's Law Department does not entrust the litigation of millions of dollars 
worth of claims against the City to la.wyers who have not been to law school or who have not passed 
the bar examination, the City cannot afford to allow billions of dollars to be spent by contracting 
personnel who lack the training and professional credentials which are commonplace in other 
jurisdictions. 107 The City must give serious thought to creating a career path for the City's 
contracting staff, with salaries competitive with the private sector and meaningful professional 
certification requirements imposed as a prerequisite for initial hire and advancement. 
104 See Commis.sion Exhibit 10. 
105 Department of General Services, Division of Municipal Supplies, bid number 1128 l. See In the Matter oflamac Frozen 
Food Corp., New York City Board of Responsibility (August 10, 1987). 
Although the vendor was subsequentJy removed from the agency's bid list, it took the agency over a year from the date 
of the debarment decision to do so. 
l06 This is in stark contrast to the U.S. General Services Administration, the federal purchasing agency, which explicitJy 
spells out that one way to meet the minimum qualifications for a position in contracting is to have attained certification either 
as a Certified Professional Contracts Manager from the National Contract Management Association, as a Certified Purchasing 
Manager from the National Association of Purchasing Management, or as a Certified Public Purchasing Officer from the National 
Institute of Governmental Purchasing. See Commission Exhibit 23 . 
The General Services Administration's Training Center offers over 30 courses in procurement management, all of which 
are open to New York City employees. These courses, many of which are taught right here in New York City, range from "Basic 
Procurement" to "Contracting for Services," "Negotiation Styles" and "Advanced Cost and Price Analysis." Yet not one of the 
24 New York City agencies asked by the Commis.sion to describe their training programs mentioned ever having taken advantage 
of these training resources. See U.S. General Services Administration Training Center, lnteragency Catalog and Schedule (Fiscal 
Year 1990). 
l07 Although the Comrnis.sion heard testimony that professional training is especially important for those buying services 
(since it is even harder to buy services than goods), Tr. at 240, these are the very people who are the least likely to seek 
professional training or certification. 
Membership records maintained by METNY, the local chapter of the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing, 
indicate that as of 1989, only eleven City employees had attained professional certification in procurement. Eight of those eleven 
employees work at OMS. 
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E. The City Must Shift Its Focus From Policing Paperwork 
To Effective Post-Audit 
Instead of hiring experienced contracting personnel and training its existing 
contracting staff to make sure that contracting decisions are made in accordance with clear, well-
defined procedures, the City relies on an extensive oversight network to police contracts and contract 
documents before the contract award is finalized. As described above, every RFP contract is reviewed 
twice by the Mayor's Office of Contracts. 108 Likewise, if only one bid is received, contracts for 
equipment and supplies put out to bid by OMS are sent to the Comptroller's office for review before 
the award is finalized. According to the Mayor's Private Sector Survey, multiple reviews and 
approvals by City oversight agencies add as much as a year and a half to City construction 
projects. 109 
The City needs to substantially reduce the "administrative micro-management burden" 
the oversight process imposes on the City's contracting operations.110 The answer, of course, is not 
to abandon controls, but to move from a system of pre-audit -- where every transaction is policed 
before it is finalized -- to a system of post-audit, a spot-check system designed to make sure that 
contracts have been awarded in accordance with the City's rules and procedures. Indeed, if clear 
rules are in place and accountability is clearly established, the threat of this kind of post-award review 
is considered a "much more cost-effective deterrent to corrupt practice than a cursory pre-review of 
every contract." 111 
Clear contracting guidelines of the sort the Procurement Policy Board is responsible 
for drafting are the sine qua non of an effective post-audit system. They are the standards against 
which the performance of City contracting staff can be measured. As the City's Auditor General 
explained at the Commission's October hearings: 112 
There should be consistent standards for everybody in the 
City of New York, and every agency will have [them] .. 
And then you have the possibility of doing the post-
auditing you're talking about, so you can remove a lot of 
the internal procedures, because you now have something 
you can audit for compliance against. 
!08 Ironically, this is true even though the Office of Contracts recently completed a comprehensive set of guidelines for 
RFPs. See Mayor's Office of Contracts, Guidelines for Mayoral Agency Contracting, Pan II. 
I09 Private Sector Survey at 35. See also id . at 20 ("excessive oversight controls, such as multiple reviews of a range of 
transactions ... impose endless and costly delays.") 
llO Id. at 36. 
ll t IPA Repon at 36. 
112 Tr. at 431. 
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In addition to making sure that the City's contracting guidelines are adhered to, an 
effective post-audit function should be designed to determine whether the City got value for the 
contract dollars it spent or whether the City "was buying cheap but paying dear." According to 
contracting staff interviewed by the Commission, there is an urgent need for the City to look back 
and ask itself: "Did we pay more than we should?" "Did we get our money's worth?" Such questions 
need to be incorporated into the City's post-audit function on a routine basis. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Almost a decade ago, the U.S. Justice Department warned that: 113 
[a] lack of management control can, all by itself, provide 
opportunities for corruption. In addition, it can magnify 
existing opportunities and minimize the risks that attend 
them. Paradoxically, too much control can have the same 
effect as too little. 
New York City's contracting operations suffer from both too little and too much 
control: too many layers of review and control, too few rules which are clear, streamlined and 
accessible to everyone. It is widely recognized outside New York City that "good management is ... 
the foremost antidote to corruption in govemment."114 Yet New York does not so much manage its 
contracting operations as police them, through a system of checkpoints and controls which threaten 
to strangle competition, efficiency and employee morale. 
Good management of the City's contracting does not require the City to launch into 
uncharted territory. The road to reform is clearly mapped out. There is widespread agreement on 
what constitutes good government procurement practices, how to implement them, and what savings 
will result. But reform requires a political commitment which, to date, has not been made. 
113 U.S. Depamnent of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Maintaining Municipal Integrity. Trainers Handbook (April 
1980) at 127 (emphasis added). 
114 !Q. at 107. 
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There is no longer time for half measures. The new City Charter creates an 
unprecedented opportunity to reform the City's outmcxled and inefficient contracting system and, at 
the same time, to safeguard that system from corruption. The City's taxpayers deserve nothing less. 
Dated: New York, New York 
December 1989 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 
John D. Feerick 
Chairman 
Richard D. Emery 
Patricia M. Hynes 
James L. Magavem 
Bernard S. Meyer 
Bishop Emerson J. Moore 
Cyrus R. Vance 
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Appendix 
GOVERNMENT CON1RACTING RESOURCE LIST 
The following agencies and organizations provide information, resource materials 
and/or training in public contracting: 
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION TRAINING CENTER (GSA) 
The United States General Services Administration's Procurement Management Training 
Institute offers over 30 training courses in purchasing and procurement. Their courses are open to 
City employees and other local government employees and are often given in New York City. 
There are entry-level courses teaching basic procurement and ethics in procurement. 
Intermediate and specialized classes cover topics such as construction contracting, evaluating a 
contractor's performance, contracting for services, and negotiating techniques. For experienced 
personnel, offerings include advanced cost and price analysis and advanced procurement management. 
To obtain a course catalogue or for further information, call the GSA at: (703) 557-0986. 
For placement on their mailing list, write: 
United States General Services Administration 
(9KS) 
525 Market Street 
San Francisco, California 94105 
INTERNATIONAL CITI MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION (ICMA) 
The professional association of administrators serving cities, counties and local government. 
Members receive access to the MIS Inquiry Service, a library of 11,000 reference documents, including 
a variety of procurement-related materials such as sample procurement documents for public works 
projects and a variety of goods and services. 
Phone: 
Address: 
(202) 626-4600 
International City Management Association 
1120 G Street 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
A - 1 
r 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PURCHASING MANAGEMENT (NAPM) 
A national organization with over 160 affiliated as.50Ciations across the county for people 
with primary responsibility for purchasing or materials management. Programs and activities include 
classes, professional purchasing manager certification, library service and conferences. 
For information call: 1-800-888-6276 (toll free) or (602) 752-6276. 
Address: National Association of Purchasing Management 
P.O. Box 22160 
Tempe, Arizona 85285-2160 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL PURCHASING (N1GP) 
A not-for-profit educational and technical organization of government contracting personnel. 
NIGP offers a range of services including seminars, professional certification, technical assistance. The 
NIGP library contains more than 20,000 specifications, publications and reports. 
For information call: (703) 533-7300 or FAX (703) 732-0915 
Address: Nita March 
Membership Manager 
National Institute of Governmental Purchasing 
115 Hillwocxi Avenue, Suite 201 
Falls Church, Virginia 22046 
ME1ROPOLITAN NEW YORK CHAPTER OF NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
GOVERNMENT PURCHASING (ME1NY) 
New York City area NIGP chapter. METNY offers training and hosts speakers on a variety 
of procurement-related topics. 
Phone: 
Address: 
(718) 271-7323 
Carla Lallatin, Executive Director 
METNY 
61-15 97th Street, Suite 7A 
Rego Park, New York 11373 
A - 2 
PURCHASING MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK (PMA) 
PMA is the New York affiliate of the National Association of Purchasing Management 
(NAPM) . PMA seeks to foster the development of essential skills and knowledge in the field of 
purchasing and materials managment. 
Phone: 
Address: 
(718) 739-4900 
Abate Kassa 
Executive Director 
Purchasing Management Association of New York 
161-01 84 Road 
Jamaica Hills, New York 11432 
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